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Abstract 
This study aims to enrich our understanding of the relationship between political connections 
and the adoption of environmental corporate socially responsible (ECSR) investments. In 
addition to the individual-level political connections, i.e., entrepreneurs’ personal ties to 
government officials, we propose in China the creation of Communist Party of China (CPC) 
branches in privately-owned firms serve as organizational and institutionalized dimensions of 
political connection building. Drawing on the social exchange theory, this paper details how 
CPC branches function in privately-owned firms and how entrepreneurs are motivated by the 
reciprocal logic to engage in ECSR. We also supplement this main effect by examining the 
boundary conditions of it at the firm- and regional-level. Using a dataset with 17,690 firm 
observations in China, we find that the existence of CPC branches gives rise to the ECSR 
investments and the firm-level contingencies such as centralized governance and financial 
constraints, and the regional-level contingencies such as the development of the market 
system, are important moderators that shape the association of political links and ECSR 
investments. These findings have ample implications to understand the ECSR activities and 
extend social exchange theory beyond the individual level on which it is typically applied.  
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Political connections play an important role in corporate social responsibility (CSR) of a firm 
(Cumming et al. 2016; Muttakin et al. 2018; Li et al. 2015; Lin et al. 2015). Present studies 
have focussed on the role of individual-level political connections (i.e., political ties between 
entrepreneurs and government officials) and presented contradictory predictions. We have a 
limited understanding of the link between political connections at the organizational level and 
CSR. In this study, we draw on a recently introduced initiative launched by the Central 
Committee of Communist Party of China (CPC) that encourages the creation of a CPC 
branch1 in privately-owned firms, which may transform individual-level political connections 
to the organizational-level in privately-owned firms. Our setting is particularly interesting 
since government relationships and political connections are of significance for privately-
owned firms in emerging economies such as China (Arnoldi and Muratova 2018; Faccio et al. 
2006; Peng and Luo 2000). A policy from the Central Committee of CPC encouraging the 
creation of in-house CPC branches offers the opportunity to examine how organizational-
level political connections matter to CSR investments.  
A second motivation for this study is that previous studies have not distinguished 
between legally binding CSR investments (i.e. obligatory CSR) and non-obligatory or 
voluntary CSR investments. Particularly in economies where there is more political and state 
influence, the general direction of policies of the government may have much more effect on 
firm investments than we would expect in more market-based settings. China has called for 
significant environmental investments to clean its air, water, and rivers from high pollution 
(Shi and Xu 2018; Wei at al. 2017; Xu 2011). For instance, the central government included 
 
1 Party branch (jiceng dangzuzhi) is the smallest unit of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) at the grassroots level. One of the 
unique characteristics of CCP is its “mass line” (qunzhong luxian) (Han 2015). In other words, CCP relays on numerous 
party branches to exercise its control over the state, economy and society in China. 
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an environmental policy by setting a 10% SO2 reduction target at the first time in the tenth 
Five-Year Plan (2001-2005) (Xu 2011; Shi and Xu 2018). 2  In 2006, the State Council 
promulgated a regulation titled “Reply to Pollution Control Plan during the Eleventh Five-
Year Plan”, which called for investments to tackle the environmental pollution at the 
provincial level. These evidence shows that the CPC has declared environmental investments 
a priority, but we know much less under what contingencies firms are engaging with these 
aims. As such, this paper focuses on non-obligatory environmental corporate social 
responsibility (ECSR3) investments. Non-obligatory investments have been argued i) in the 
more economically oriented literature to be driven by long-term benefits for the firm or ii) in 
the CSR literature to be driven by ethical or philanthropic motives (Carroll 1991).  
A third motivation for this study is that the boundary conditions of the links between 
political connections and ECSR investment have obtained limited attention (Dong et al. 
2016). Several studies have distinguished firm types to better understand their CSR 
investments, but have not looked at contingencies within the same type of firms. For example, 
Lin et al. (2015) demonstrated that political connections are more likely to drive CSR 
activities in non-state-controlled firms, smaller firms, and firms operating in cities ruled by a 
more corrupt government. Li et al. (2015) also found that there is a stronger relationship 
between political connections and corporate philanthropy in non-state-owned firms. The 
studies miss to explore how intra-firm characteristics (e.g., corporate governance and 
 
2  China's five-year plans are a series of countrywide social and economic development initiatives containing detailed 
guidelines for economic and social development. The tenth Five-Year Plan (2001-2005) was the first to include an 
environmental policy by setting a 10% SO2 reduction target. In the eleventh Five-Year Plan (2006-2010), the central 
government establishes a pollution reduction target 10% for the entire country with different provinces sharing different 
burdens. In 2006, the China State Council issued a document named “Reply to Pollution Control Plan During the Eleventh 
Five-Year Plan”, which handed down national goal to pollution reduction targets in provincial level. Formal contracts for the 
provincial pollution reduction targets were signed by the provincial vice presidents.  
3 In this project, ECSR refers to a firm’s voluntary environmental investment, including investment in sewage treatment, air 
pollution treatment, soil pollution treatment, solid waste treatment, flue gas treatment, waste recycling and so on. These 
investments are not obligated. In other words, there is no explicit government policy which forces firms to invest in these 
items, but our data shows that some firms scarify their private benefits to do so. 
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financial conditions) and regional characteristics (e.g., development of the market economy) 
affect the relationship between political connections and ECSR.  
To address these gaps, this paper aims to explore the following two questions: How do 
organizational-level political connections affect entrepreneurs’ non-obligatory ECSR 
investments? What are the key contingencies that affect the implications of such political 
connections on ECSR? We define entrepreneurs for the purpose of this study as owners of 
privately-owned firms in which they hold more than half of the equity share. As such, the 
decisions of the entrepreneur are likely to converge with those made on the firm-level (Zhao 
and Lu 2016). Non-obligatory ECSR investments are investments that go beyond the legal 
requirements “to contribute to a better society and cleaner environment (OECD 2001)”. The 
literature on corporate social responsibility (CSR) has moved from an initial social focus 
(Carroll 1999) to increasingly include the environment as a second core factor (Dahlsrud 
2008). A focus on the environmental aspect seems appropriate as it differs conceptually from 
the social challenges due to the institutional environment (Matten and Moon 2008) and is 
most timely during an ever-increasing urge to tackle climate change. In addition, political 
connections have often been overlooked in the ECSR literature, for example, the work of 
Babiak and Trendafilovia (2011) on motivations for ECSR.  
We use social exchange theory to address the questions. Social exchange theory explains 
exchanges and how they happen. It also helps analysing relationships formed on the basis of 
social exchanges (Cropanzano and Mitchell 2005; Emerson 1976). Often, exchanges underlie 
the idea of reciprocity in some forms. The setting created by entrepreneurs and their CPC 
party branches fits such patterns well. Much of the literature on social exchange theory has 
discussed individual exchanges rather than exchanges between individuals and organizational 
entities. In this paper, however, we are going to approach the exchanges between individuals 
(i.e., entrepreneurs) and organizational entities (i.e., CPC branches in privately-owned firms). 
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In addition, most of the social exchange theory has evolved around economic exchanges. In 
our setting, other forms may play a role, for example, information, power or philanthropy. 
We tested our theoretical framework by looking at 17,690 observations of a random 
sample of firms. We find that the existence of CPC branches gives rise to the ECSR 
investments and the firm-level contingencies such as centralized governance and financial 
constraints, and the regional-level contingencies such as the development of the market 
system, are important moderators that shape the association of political links and ECSR 
investments. 
Our study contributes to the literature in three ways. First, we shed new light on the 
association of political connections and ECSR. We explore a contingency model of the 
effects of an organizational level political connection (i.e., the creation of CPC branches) on 
ECSR and how these effects vary according to different organizational and regional factors, 
greatly enriching our understanding of how and when political connections matter to CSR. 
We focus our attention on the ECSR because this dimension of CSR deserves particular 
attention due to its nature and the extent of the challenge that it addresses (e.g. with reference 
to the debate on climate change). While ECSR appears a pertinent issue, the role of political 
connections for commercial decision-making in this context is underexplored (Babiak and 
Trendafilovia 2011).  
Second, we extend the CSR literature by clearly distinguishing non-obligatory and 
obligatory ECSR investments. While in accounting research, we find a study on voluntary 
disclosure (e.g., Graham et al. 2004), this idea has not readily been transferred to the 
management literature. However, this distinction is helpful for disentangling some of the 
motivations underlying CSR investments.  Our study is particularly suitable to make this 
argument as our setting can clearly distinguish between these two kinds of investments. 
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Third, our study contributes to the social exchange theory. Social exchange theory has 
primarily focused on theorizing exchanges between two people. Despite calls for studies that 
extend the scope of the theory, there is very limited literature that has applied social exchange 
theory beyond individual-level settings (Cropanzano et al. 2017). We extend the social 
exchange theory by using it to explicate the exchanges between individuals (i.e., 
entrepreneurs) and organizational entities (i.e., party branches in privately-owned firms). A 
strength of our study is the focus on entrepreneurs who own (by majority share) their firms 
and thus are able to interact with the CPC branches in their firms. Such a setting facilitates us 
to approach the social exchange theory in a unique way and extend its applications.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We briefly review relevant 
literature streams and build our hypotheses. Then, we introduce our empirical setting and 
method before reporting the results. Finally, we discuss the results and the limitations of the 
study before concluding with the takeaways of this study. 
Theory and hypotheses 
We adopt the social exchange theory to build our argument. According to this theory, 
exchanges are motivated by reciprocity (Cropanzano et al. 2017; Cropanzano and Mitchell 
2005). Reciprocity comes in different forms (economic, cultural etc.), as indirect, direct, or 
possibly third-party reciprocity. In our setting, the exchange happened between entrepreneurs 
and the CPC party in their firms. We detail how CPC branches function in privately-owned 
firms and how entrepreneurs are motivated by the reciprocal logic to engage in ECSR. 
Political connections and non-obligatory ECSR investments 
In emerging economies, institutions are often shaped in a co-creation process between the 
government/ruling party and firms in which firms help writing regulations, policies and laws 
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(Xing et al. 2018). Some firms even live off following and exploiting these regulations and 
policies (Dai and Liao 2018). In such settings, entrepreneurs have strong incentives to 
maintain good relations to the government and/or the CPC (Li et al. 2008; Peng and Luo 
2000). The study by Hilman et al. (2004) shows that political connections are strategically 
used to gain competitive advantage. As a result, political connections are pervasive in 
emerging economies and frequently discussed in the management literature (Luo et al. 2018; 
Tihanyi et al. 2019).  
In addition to entrepreneurs’ personal ties to government officials, one types of 
individual-level political connections, prior research has treated the establishment of CPC 
branch in private firms as a measure of political connection as well (e.g., Dong et al. 2016). 
Indeed, these branches are the grassroots of CPC, which link privately-owned firms and the 
party-state in an organic manner. CPC branches institutionalize the firm’s involvement in the 
institutional shaping process (Yan and Jie 2017). The motivation of the CPC to set up CPC 
branches in privately-owned firms is to ensure that these firms are under the “correct” 
directions (Dong et al. 2016; Yan and Jie 2017). Additionally, the CPC relies on these 
branches to encourage the participation and support of privately-owned firms in terms of 
mobilizing resources for social issues and the public good if necessary (Sun and Wright 
2012). Typically, these social issues include environmental protection, deterioration, and 
social issues relating to work conditions. The latter tend to be closer handled by the unions 
while the former is one of the central aspects that firms are frequently called on to help; often 
on a non-obligatory basis.  
To fulfill such objectives, the CPC branches in privately-owned firms strive all out to 
assist the entrepreneurs to develop their businesses in that they are aware that the privately-
owned firms are not able to shoulder the social responsibilities until they achieve a sound 
economic development goal (Dong et al. 2016). The entrepreneurs in privately-owned firms 
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may even feel that a creation of CPC branch is unwise if it is not of help in achieving 
economic success. After all, running a CPC branch in their own firms is resource-consuming 
even though higher-level CPC organizations (i.e., local Committees of the CPC) supply 
considerable resources to these Party branches. The CPC branches in privately-owned firms 
understand that they will have the space to survive only when they are able to contribute to 
the economic development of the privately-owned firms in which they are embedded. As a 
result, the CPC branches try their best to assist these firms by actively offering their advice to 
entrepreneurs and by guiding the employees to devote their time and efforts to critical issues 
that are facing privately-owned firms.  
Indeed, the CPC branches can substantially contribute to privately-owned firms for two 
reasons. On the one hand, each CPC branch is under the supervision of local Committees of 
the CPC, which is closely linked to local government (for the organization of CPC branches, 
please refer to Dong et al. (2016)). Accordingly, the CPC branches are well-informed of the 
current agenda of local government and the government policies, which are valuable to 
privately-owned firms especially in the emerging market setting (Dai and Liao 2018). On the 
other hand, the leaders of CPC branches receive training from their upper organizations on 
how to accelerate the development of privately-owned firms by nurturing positive 
organizational culture, boosting the innovative and entrepreneurial spirits among employees 
as well as maintaining the employees’ morale. These aspects may truly spur the development 
of privately-owned firms in promising directions.  
In viewing these positive “spillovers” created by the CPC branches, entrepreneurs may 
feel that they are greatly benefited from the CPC. In return, they feel they need to “do 
something” to pay back the positive inputs by these CPC branches. We posit that it is a social 
exchange or reciprocity logic that shapes the interactions between entrepreneurs and CPC 
branches in their firms (Cropanzano and Mitchell 2005; Emerson 1976). Entrepreneurs may 
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thus echo to the calls from the CPC voluntarily and actively. As have mentioned, the goals of 
CPC involve not only economic developments, but also social developments and welfare 
provisions. The party-state cannot manage the latter as a lone player, but needs the buy-in of 
firms (Scherer et al. 2014). Those privately-owned firms that have achieved economic 
success with the assistance of their in-house Party apparatus may align with the CPC’s social 
goals and thus engage in such activities as doing ECSR voluntarily (Frynas ad Stephens 
2015). Indeed, ECSR has been at the forefront of improving the environmental conditions in 
China (Wei at al. 2017).  
In addition to such “backward looking”, entrepreneurs may also “look forward”. That is, 
they may realize that their interactions with the CPC branches is a long-term game and that 
alignment with the CPC and doing good for the society may trigger the CPC and their in-
house organizations (i.e., the CPC branches) to devote more resources and efforts to their 
firms’ development in the future (Lin et al. 2015). After all, the CPC controls a range of 
critical resources via its government system such as land distribution, much of the banking 
sector, regulations across industries (Dong et al. 2016). In the context of the emerging market, 
firms rely on access to these resources for the prosperity of their businesses (Fischer and 
Reuber 2010). In addition, the CPC branches are really able to function as an “engine” for 
their firms. In sum, entrepreneurs may act even more voluntarily if they view their actions in 
the long-term. We label this effect as the future rewarding logic.  
Taken together, entrepreneurs may look backward as well as look forward 
simultaneously in viewing CPC branches in their firms and respond positively to engage in 
ECSR. We thus propose the following hypothesis:  




Firm- and regional-level contingencies 
The extent to which a CPC branch executes its influence on a privately-owned firm and can 
foster one of the central CPC goals such as ECSR investments is likely mitigated by the 
number of stakeholders and goal alignment in a firm (March and Cyert 1963). This is because 
entrepreneurs’ willingness to reciprocate in terms of committing to the CPC party goals will 
be suppressed by the multiple stakeholders who may have differing interests and time 
horizons.  
Prior research has looked at the degree of centralization of governance for decision-
outcomes. Many of these follow the resource dependence logic (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). 
Zhao and Lu (2016), for instance, find that firms with more governance mechanisms seem to 
have more difficulties in making use of political capital. Many private firms have a diverse 
base of stakeholders with often unaligned or unclear interests (Tang and Tang 2012). In such 
a situation, any decision-making will be more complex and the CPC branch as an additional 
stakeholder may have limited influence over the decision-making process and the alignment 
process of the different stakeholders’ interests. Although entrepreneurs are the main decision-
makers in our sample of Chinese privately-owned firms (Lu and Zhao 2016), they may still 
need to consider the differing interests of others. Some shareholders may be short-term 
oriented and the engagement of ECSR may not be in line with their interests. In such a 
scenario, it may be hard for entrepreneurs to follow the CPC goals and non-obligatory ECSR 
investments may become less likely to be a shared goal of the majority of stakeholders, let 
along executing such investments.  
Firms with a single decision-maker, in contrast, may follow the reciprocity logic to do 
the ECSR investments more easily (Cropanzano et al. 2017). Firms with single decision-
makers that benefited from adopting a CPC branch are likely to commit to the initiatives 
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launched by the CPC branch, as otherwise, entrepreneurs would feel guilty and unease 
(Cropanzano and Mitchell 2005; Emerson 1976). While privately-owned firms with multiple 
stakeholders may have decision-making processes that have to align the interests of a 
diversity of stakeholders, firms with single decision-makers may adopt a much more strategic 
role when it comes to the voluntary adoption of ECSR investments.  
To summarize, the existence of centralized governance (i.e., entrepreneurs hold the 
majority power of decision making) may better translate her/his willingness and voluntary to 
reciprocal into concrete investments that are in line with the CPC’s goals and expectations. 
We thus propose the following hypothesis: 
H2: The positive association between CPC branch and ECSR is strengthened in firms 
with centralized governance.  
We suggest that financial constraints are another firm-level contingency that is able to 
shape the link between CPC branch and ECSR. The ethical ECSR investor may act more 
cautiously in a low munificence environment. As Chen et al. (2017) argue, 
entrepreneurs/firms in munificent environments are more likely to behave environmentally 
responsible. The reciprocity on the part of an entrepreneur to engage in ECSR could be 
affected by differing levels of internal financial munificence because the financial slack is a 
precondition of voluntary investments (Julian and Ofori-Dankwan 2013). Allocating 
resources from privately-owned firms in times of crisis or low earnings to – in the short-term 
non-essential task – goes against the nature of the interests of any stakeholder. For example, 
the financial crisis may pose significant challenges to privately-owned firms that in turn are 
less likely to invest in initiatives peripheral to their core business. Privately-owned firms may 
deploy their resources to mitigate the negative impact of urgent issues. Accordingly, the slack 
resources of the firm shrink. In such a scenario, entrepreneurs’ motivation to do ECSR 
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investments will decrease. Hence, entrepreneurs may not undertake as many ECSR activities 
as in less constraint times even when feeling indebted to their CPC branches as well as 
anticipating possible future returns from the CPC.  
In sum, the implementation of ECSR depends not only on the willingness of 
entrepreneurs to reciprocate but also on the financial situations of their firms. This leads us to 
predict that the influence of CPC branches in private firms on ECSR hinges on the firms’ 
financial constraints. We propose the following hypothesis:  
H3: The positive association between CPC branch and CSR is weakened in a high 
financial constraint environment. 
The implications of CPC branches on ECSR may be different in various regions. 
Differences between regions are often characterized by the degree of market development 
(Gao and Hafsi 2015; Sun et al. 2014). Higher market-orientation comes a better 
infrastructure (i.e., legal, etc.) for businesses and less government intervention (Zhou and 
Poppo 2010). In these more marketized regions, privately-owned firms are able to develop 
prosperously and account for the majority of the local economy (Kafouros and Aliyev 2016). 
In such a setting, we expect the association between CPC branch and ECSR investment to be 
more pronounced.  
As we have articulated before, one factor influencing voluntary ECSR investments in 
our setting is the potential “paybacks” from the party-state in the future for doing these 
investments today. In our setting, the potential payback actions of the CPC for reciprocating 
voluntary contributions to the goals of the CPC are provision of critical resources at the 
control of government and/or CPC, which are of importance in terms of privately-owned 
firms’ growth and development (Peng and Luo 2000; Li et al. 2008). While the 
CPC/government holds a considerable amount of resources, the portion allocated to the 
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private sector has a maximum limit. As mentioned above, the private sector usually accounts 
for a larger proportion of the economy in market developed regions and thus tends to involve 
more privately-owned firms. As a result, the competition for these valuable opportunities and 
resources from the CPC/government among privately-owned firms arises inevitably in these 
regions. Privately-owned firms, in view of the potential “paybacks” from the 
CPC/government and spurred by the competitions among peers (Gao and Hafsi 2015), are 
thus actively aligned with CPC goals (for example through a CPC branch) and engage in 
ECSR investment to favor the government/ruling party.  
Accordingly, we expect to see stronger relationships between CPC branch and ECSR 
investments in market-oriented regions due to the competitive nature of winning the future 
benefits of payback from voluntary ECSR investments. We thus propose the following 
hypothesis:  
H4: The positive association between CPC branch and ECSR is strengthened in more 
market-oriented regions.  
Figure 1 summarized all the hypotheses we proposed above.  
 





Sample and Data 
Our main data source is the Chinese Private Enterprises Survey (CPES). The CPES 
conducted by the Privately-Owned Enterprises Research Project Team4 is one of the longest-
running and large-scale ongoing national sample surveys in China. Such a large-scale survey 
endorsed by the government is designed to collect information from the Chinese private 
sector to facilitate the central government’s policy-making processes.  
The survey is carried out every two years, and so far, it has been conducted for 13 times 
in 1993, 1995, 1997, 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012, 2014, 2016 and 2018 
respectively. So far, the data from 1993-2012 are open to researchers for academic use; the 
data for 2014 is available conditionally, and the rest are unavailable. We get the authorization 
from Research Center for Private Enterprises at Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (PCPE-
CASS) to use this series of the survey. 
The dataset is by far the best one for studying the private business owners and privately-
owned firms in China5. It contains several parts: the characteristics of the entrepreneurs (e.g., 
education and political affiliation) and the characteristics of the firm (e.g., age, size, 
investment, political action, etc). The information on CSR becomes available since 2006, 
 
4  Member organizations include All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce, State Administration for Market 
Regulation, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, the China Society of Private Economy, and the United Front Work 
Department of CCP 
5 According to the project team, to make the survey be representative to the population of nationwide registered private firms, 
a stratified random sampling procedure is applied. The stratifications include locations, industries, stages of economic 
development, and distribution of the private firms in urban and rural areas within each location (a city or a county). The 
original sample frame for this survey is a modified version of the private enterprise section sample frame used for its annual 
data collection by the China State Bureau of Statistics, which is considered to be representative of all registered private 
enterprises in China. In particular, the sampling involved two stages. In the first stage, a pre-specified number of counties 
were selected in each province based on economic development levels, so that both developed and less developed counties 
were represented. In the second stage, a pre-specified number of private firms were selected in each county based on location 
and primary industrial sector. Both urban and rural firms were chosen; and within each urban/rural area, firms from all 
industrial sectors were sampled. The number of sampled firms in each province, county, urban/rural area, and sector was 
proportionate to the population size of the private enterprises in each of these categories. 
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which allows us to explore the motivations of why entrepreneurs / decision-makers may 
invest in ECSR in China. 
The surveys covered all provinces and over one-third of the cities in China, and the 
average sample size is around 3,000 for each survey. For example, the sample which could be 
used for the regression analysis of the 2006 survey includes 2579 privately-owned firms 
located in 100 cities; 3103 privately-owned firms located in 141 cities for the 2008 survey, 
3437 privately-owned firms located in 142 cities for the 2010 survey, 3927 privately-owned 
firms located in 158 cities for the 2012 survey, and 4645 privately-owned firms located in 
200 cities for the 2014 survey. We thus constructed a pooled cross-section dataset containing 
17,690 firm observations. Table 1 shows that these sample firms were drawn from 31 
provinces in China. And the distribution of the sample firms is in accordance with the private 
sector development in various regions, thus indicating the representative of these sample 
firms. Table 1 also presents the yearly distribution of the industries to which these private 
firms belong. It shows that most of the privately-owned firms in our sample are concentrated 
in manufacturing, construction, wholesale and retail industries. This also coincides with the 
fact that most of the privately-owned firms are in the labour-intensive sectors in China. 
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
Dependent variable 
ECSR (EnInvest, InEnInvest): We are interested in whether the existence of CPC branch 
shapes privately-owned firms’ CSR activities especially those related to environmental 
protection. We thus use privately-owned firms’ voluntary environmental investments as CSR 
16 
 
investment. To make sure that our results are robust enough, we measure it in two different 
ways. To capture the firm’s willingness to engage in the environmental CSR, we firstly 
generate EnInvest, a dummy variable, which equals to one if the firm has environmental 
investment at the time of the survey and equals to zero otherwise. To measure the extent of 
environmental CSR, we further generate lnEnInvest, the log transformation of the 
environmental investments. 
Independent variable 
CPC branch (PB): To estimate the effects of the Party branch on CSR, we generate the 
“Party branch (PB)” variable. As a dummy variable, it is equal to one if a focal firm has 
already set up a CPC branch within the firm in the surveyed year, and it is equal to zero 
otherwise. 
Moderator 
Central Governance (CenGovern): The moderator in H2 will be used to measure whether 
the entrepreneur has the dominant power in the decision-making process in a firm. We 
construct a dummy variable, CenGovern, and it is equal to one if the entrepreneur reported 
himself/herself in the survey that he/she was the final decision-maker.  
Financial Constraint (FC): FC is the moderator for H3 which equals one if the firm does 
not pay any dividend in the survey year. Fazzari et al. (1988) argue that financially 
constrained firms are less likely to pay a dividend to their investors.6  
 
6 As a robustness check, we construct two variables to proxy the firm’s financial environment based on the firm’s basic 
characteristics: 1) Following Campello et al. (2010), we treated the financial crisis in 2008 as an external financial constraint 
shock for firms. FC1 equals to one if the time of the survey is 2010, and it equals to zero, otherwise; 2) FC2 equals to one if 
firms with the HP index higher than the average, otherwise zero. Prior studies show that small and young firms are more 
likely to suffer financial constraint. We constructed the HP Index, following Hadlock and Pierce (2010), as –0.737*Size + 
0.043*Size2 –0.040*Age, where Size equals the log of sales, and Age is the number of years the firm is established. The 
results of our robustness check are available on request. 
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Market Orientation (MarOrient): Following Li et al. (2008), we use the proportion of total 
fixed investment in a province that comes from privately-owned firms as the moderator to 
measure the regional level of market orientation in H4. A higher value of the variable, 
MarOrient, indicates a better development of the market system. These data come from the 
Bureau of Statistics of China.  
Control variable 
We included several control variables that influence firms’ CSR into our regression models 
as well. Entrepreneurs’ political connection may affect the firms’ CSR (Lin et al. 2015), so 
we control entrepreneurs’ current political connections and political capital. Following Lu 
and Zhao (2016), Jia (2014）and Guo et al. (2014), we include the following variables to our 
model: 1) Party member, a dummy variable that equals to one if the firm’s owner is a 
member of the CPC at the time of survey and equals to zero if otherwise; 2) Prior_gov_job, 
a dummy variable that equals to one if the firm’s owner used to work for either the 
government or the CPC before founding the firm and equals to zero if otherwise; 3) PC, a 
dummy variable that equals to one if the firm’s owner is a member of the People’s Congress 
at the time of survey and equals to zero if otherwise; 4) CPPCC, a dummy variable that 
equals to one if the firm’s owner is a member of the People’s Consultative Conference at the 
time of survey and equals to zero if otherwise. 
We also control the entrepreneur’s gender (Gender) and age (CEO_age). 
Entrepreneur’s education background is measure by another dummy variable, Edu_dummy, 
and it equals to one if the entrepreneur has obtained a bachelor’s degree or above at the time 
of the survey year and equals to zero if otherwise. As suggested by Lepoutre and Heene 
(2006) and Cheung et al. (2012), the firm’s size, profitability and CSR performance are 
correlated with each other, so we use the log value of its total sales to measure the firm’s size 
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(Size_sales), and use the ratio of net profit over sales to measure the firm’s profitability 
(ROS). Firms’ age (Firm_age) was controlled for as well. 
The summary statistics of all variables are presented in Table 2, and the pairwise 
correlation matrix among these variables is presented in Table 3. On average, 34.5% of the 
sample firms have invested in ECSR, and on average they invested 158170 RMB every year 
to protect the environment. In our sample, 33.1% of the firms already had set up the CPC 
branches in their firm. Currently, 24.1% of the entrepreneurs are a member of PC, and 30.4% 
of the entrepreneurs are a member of CPPCC. Also, about 35.8% of the entrepreneurs are 
CPC members; and 16.6% of the entrepreneurs are had been government officials before they 
set up their businesses. Moreover, as high as 57% the entrepreneurs hold a bachelor’s degree 
or above. 
 
 [Insert Table 2 and Table 3 about here] 
 
Results 
Table 4 presents the univariate tests between firms with and without the CPC branch, and the 
t-statistics shows preliminary evidence that supports our H1 that privately-owned firms with 
the CPC branch engage in more ECSR no matter which measures of ECSR is used. It also 
shows that the entrepreneurs of firms with CPC branches are more likely to have a political 
connection and political capital, and these firms are larger and older, so it is important to 




 [Insert Table 4 about here] 
 
To examine whether the adoption of CPC branch affects the privately-owned firms’ 
ECSR performance, hierarchical linear models7 (firm level and regional level) with industry 
and year fixed effect controlled is implemented when the dependent variable is LnEnInvest, 
and hierarchical nonlinear model is used when the dependent variable is EnInvest. The 
estimation results are presented in Table 5.8 The coefficients of Party branch (PB) in Model 
(1) and (2) are both positively significant at 0.1% level, suggesting that the adoption of the 
Party branch will significantly increase the willingness and the extent of the firm’s ESCR 
investment. Specifically, we find that: the probability of investing in ECSR will increase by 
10.5% if the privately-owned firm already sets up the Party branch (PB); The ECSR 
investment will be RMB 26,914 higher for the firm with the Party branch (PB).  In all, Table 
6’s Model (1) and (2) support Hypothesis 1 that privately-owned firms with Party branch (PB) 
bear more ECSR. 
 
7 We thank the anonymous reviewer for pointing out that hierarchical linear model (HML) is more appropriate for our nested 
data (firms within regions) than the OLS model. Although both our independent variable (PB) and dependent variable 
(ECSR) are at the firm level, one of our moderators is at the provincial level. According to Hofmann (1997), hierarchical 
linear models provide a conceptual and statistical mechanism for investigating and drawing conclusions regarding the 
influence of phenomena at different levels of analysis.  
Our HML models consisted of two levels. At level 1, the unit of analysis was the firm, and each firm’s ECSR investment 
was a function of firm-level factors. The level 1’s model is: ECSR i,j = β0j+β1jXij+rij. i indexes each firm, j indexes each 
province, Xij is the vector of firm-level factors, including PB and other firm-level controls. β0j and β1j are, respectively, the 
intercept and slopes estimated for each province, and rij is the residual. At level 2, the unit of analysis was the province, 
where the dependent variable was hypothesized to depend on specific province factors adjusted for the regression 
coefficients in the level 1 model. Thus, we used an intercept-as-outcome models instead of a slopes-as-outcome model. The 
level 2’s model is: β0j = γ00+γ01Gj+U0j. where β0j is the intercept from the level 1 equation above, Gj is the provincial-level 
variable, γ00 is the second level intercept terms and γ01 is the slope relating the province-level-independent variable G to the 
intercept, and U0j is the level 2 residual. Thus, to estimate the moderator effect of MarOrient using the HML model, we 
added the PB and its interaction term with MarOrient into level 1’s model and added the MarOrient into level 2’s model. 
This is because the interaction term between PB and MarOrient is actually a firm-level factor. 
Specifically, we estimated the HML models by using the Stata commands “mixed” and “meprobit” (StataCorp 2013). A 
random-effects model, as opposed to a fixed-effect model, was used to deal with variance in our firm-level variables. This 
means, for the regressions that do not include the provincial-level independent variable, our HML models just include a 
random effect at the provincial level.  
8 We calculate the centered variance inflation factors (VIFs) after each of our regression model. The centered VIFs for all 
variables are no higher than 1.5, indicating that our specification does not suffer multicollinearity. To save the space, the 




[Insert Table 5 about here] 
 
We subsequently test whether the relationship between Party branch (PB) and ECSR is 
affected by the central governance in private firms. In Table 5’s columns (3) and (4), we add 
the CenGovern and the interaction term between Party branch (PB) and CenGovern into the 
model. The coefficients of Party branch (PB) are significantly positive, indicating that there is 
a positive correlation between Party branch (PB) and ECSR. Furthermore, the coefficients of 
the interaction term between Party branch (PB) and CenGovern are positively significant at a 
5% level as well which shows that privately-owned firms with single decision-makers are 
prone to respond to their Party branch (PB) to pursue ECSR investment. In all, we find that 
the hypothesized moderating effects of CenGovern are statistically significant.  
The interaction plots in Fig.2’s Column (1) shows the moderator effect of the 
CenGovern. However, Holmbeck (2002) points out that “the presence of a significant 
interaction tells us that there is significant moderation, but tells us little about the specific 
conditions that dictate whether the predictor is significantly related to the outcome.” So, we 
further conduct a post-hoc probing test by split our sample into two parts by the moderators. 
Results in Appendix Table 2’s Panel A show that: 1) party branch setup significantly results 
in more ECSR for both types of firms with and without the central governance; 2) the effect 
of party branch setup on ECSR are more pronounced for subsample in which privately-
owned firms with the central governance. The above findings support our Hypothesis 2 that 
the positive association between CPC branch and ECSR is strengthened when there is central 
governance in the privately-owned firm. 
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We further revise our specification to control Party branch, FC and the interaction term 
between them in Table 5’s columns (5) and (6), and then we can test the moderating effect of 
FC. The coefficients of the interaction term between PB and FC are negatively significant at 
10% level in Model (5) and 5% level at Model (6) respectively, indicating that firms’ 
financial constraints impact its investment in ESCR. The interaction plot and post-hoc 
probing test also support the moderator effect of FC. These findings prove the statistical 
significance of the hypothesized moderating effects of FC, and support our Hypothesis 3 that 
the positive association between CPC branch and ECSR is weakened when the privately-
owned firm confronts financial constraint.  
In Table 5’s columns (7) and (8), we control Party branch, MarOrient and the interaction 
term between Party branch and MarOrient. Such specification is designed to test the 
moderating effect of MarOrient. Again, the coefficients of PB are significantly positive all 
the time, indicating that there is a robust positive correlation between CPC branch and ECSR. 
The coefficients of the interaction term between PB and MarOrient are positively significant 
at 10% level in Model (7) and 1% level at Model (8) respectively, which shows that the 
adoption of CPC branch has a stronger effect on ECSR for firms located in regions with the 
better developed market system. The interaction plot and post-hoc probing test also support 
the empirical findings. So, the hypothesized moderating effects of market development are 
proved to be statistically significant. These findings support our Hypothesis 4 that the positive 
association between CPC branch and ECSR is strengthened when the private firm is located 





Table 5 shows the positive correlation between the existence of CPC branch and ECSR, but it 
may not be the causality, because the positive correlation may be caused by self-selection 
biases. For example, it is possible that firms with higher profitability, politically connected 
entrepreneurs or policy guided industries are more likely to set up CPC branch and invest in 
ECSR. If this is true, the observed positive correlation is caused by ex-ante selection. To rule 
out such concern, the propensity score matching (PSM) algorithm is utilized to construct the 
control sample following Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), through which the ex-ante selection 
biased can be controlled as much as possible. 
In model (1) of Table 6, privately-owned firms with CPC branch are matched with those 
without CPC branch on multiple dimensions of firm characteristics including firm size 
(Size_sales), age (Firm_age) and profitability (ROS). And we only use the matched privately-
owned firms without CPC branch for comparison. The panel for model (1) presents the 
comparison of means of ECSR investment (measured by EnInvest and LnEnInvest) for the 
firms with and without CPC branch before (unmatched) and after (ATT) the matching. It 
shows that the difference between firms with and without CPC branch in terms of CSR 
investment is still significantly positive after the matching, although the magnitudes of the 
differences drop after the matching. Similarly, as the robustness checks, in model (2) of Table 
6, privately-owned firms with CPC branch are matched with those without CPC branch on 
entrepreneur characteristics (political connections (Party_member, PC, CPPCC, 
Prior_gov_job), gender (Gender), age (CEO_age), education (Edu_dummy)) besides firm 
characteristics, and in model (3) of Table 6, privately-owned firms with CPC branch are 
matched with those without CPC branch on firm characteristics, entrepreneur characteristics, 
industry and year. The findings remain unchanged. The estimates suggest that privately-
23 
 
owned firms with CPC branch outperform privately-owned firms without CPC branch in 
CSR investment after the potential ex-ante selection effects are controlled. 
 
 [Insert Table 6 about here] 
 
Although PSM helps to cease the concern of ex-ante selection bias, the positive 
correlation may be caused by unobserved factors, such as privately-owned firms’ culture. For 
example, if more socially responsible firms are more likely to set up CPC branch, the 
observed correlation is inflated by the unobservable variables. To solve the potential 
endogeneity problem, we use 2SLS with two instrument variables (IVs) to identify the effect 
of CPC branch. 9  
Following Guo et al. (2014), we use the existence of the labor union in a firm as the first 
IV. China’s Labor Union Law was adopted in 2001, and the CPC encouraged every 
organization to set up a labor union including non-SOEs. But every unionized firm has to pay 
2.5 percent of its payroll to support its union, so privately-owned firms have a little financial 
incentive to voluntarily set up the union. As unionization is encouraged by the CPC, we 
expect firms with CPC branches are more likely to have a union. However, the existence of 
the labor union in a firm alone should not be directly related to ECSR. Moreover, motivated 
by Hausman et al. (1994), we follow Du et al. (2015) to construct PB-Environ as the second 
IV. PB-Environ is the average ratio of privately-owned firms that already setup party 
branches in the survey year calculate by other surveyed firms in the same city. 
 
9 We conducted a Durbin-Wu-Hausman (DWH) Endogeneity tests. The p-value of the DWH test is 0.000, rejecting the null 
hypothesis that “the specified endogenous regressors can actually be treated as exogenous”. This means that PB is an 
endogenous variable and the results in Table 5 maybe bias. 
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Table 7 reports the two-stage least square model regressions for ECSR when the CPC 
branch is instrumented by Union and PB-Environ. The first stage regression result confirms 
that both instrumental variables Union and PB-Environ are significantly and positively 
correlated to CPC branch. The second stage regression results show that after the CPC branch 
is instrumented by Union and PB-Environ, the existence of CPC branch is still positively and 
significantly correlated with ECSR measured by all means, confirming the causality 
relationship between CPC branch and ECSR. Furthermore, Sargan tests (overidentification 
tests) fail to reject the null hypothesis that the instruments are exogenous, indicating the 
exogeneity of the two IVs. Wald tests (underidentification tests) reject the null hypothesis 
that our instruments are irrelevant. The two tests jointly show that our two IVs are relevant 
and exogeneous.  
 
 [Insert Table 7 about here] 
 
In addition, as pointed by one of the referees, the positive correlation between ECSR 
investments and the existence of the PB may be due to government policy, especially when 
China starts to emphasize more and more the importance of environment protection. Actually, 
the Chinese government started to implement the Two Control Zones (TCZ) policy since 
1998.10 Tougher environmental regulations were imposed on firms located in these zones. So, 
firms in our sample which are located in TCZ are more likely to be influenced by government 
policy. In other words, their total investments are more likely to be affected by government 
policy rather than voluntary incentives. We divide our sample into two samples, firms located 





driven by government policy is right, the coefficient of PB for firms located outside the TCZ 
should be insignificant. The results are shown in Table 8. The estimated coefficients of PB 
for firms located outside TCZ are significant from Model (3) to (4). This subsample analysis 
shows that after controlling the effect of government policy, firms with party branches have 
more ECSR.  
 
 [Insert Table 8 about here] 
 
Discussion and conclusion 
Our study is centrally interested in the endeavour to explain how political connections 
motivate firms ECSR investments for a more environmentally sustainable future.  Motivated 
by the reciprocal logic, an entrepreneur who benefited from adopting a CPC branch is likely 
to try to score with the CPC and thus to invest in ECSR (Cropanzano and Mitchell 2005; 
Cropanzano et al. 2017; Emerson 1976). One the one hand, they can eliminate the pressure 
originated from the reciprocity, help the goals of the Party, and gain credit for potential 
intrinsic motivations. On the other hand, they can gain potential positive feedback from the 
CPC in the future in the form of access to resources or the involvement in the consultation 
processes for new legislation that is relevant to their business.  
We examine these ideas based on data analyses of a sample of 17,690 privately-owned 
firms in China and find that privately-owned firms with CPC branches are indeed more likely 
to undertake non-obligatory ECSR investments. This association is more pronounced when 
entrepreneurs are the final decision-makers in their firms and when firms are located in 
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regions with higher levels of market-orientation. The link is weakened when entrepreneurs 
face financial constraints. However, in all cases, the size of the investment is fairly small.  
Theoretical implications 
Our study contributes to the literature in three ways. First, we identify an organizational 
level political connection (i.e., adoption of the CPC branch) and connect it to non-obligatory 
investments. Interestingly, the system of CPC branches is based on removing the idea of 
direct reciprocity between people to potential long-term benefits that are – while culturally 
embedded – vague in its extent, institutionalized on the organizational level, and unspecific 
regarding the temporal sphere. Filling the gap between charitable giving and fulfilling legal 
obligations is an important step to open up a space that is potentially neither entirely 
humanistic in its motivation, nor entirely economically motivated. Instead, there may be a 
dual sphere in which both motivations exist. From our setting, we also learn that a third 
motivational factor such as personal belief may be considered to be influential for voluntary 
investment decisions as well as potential reciprocal actions. Our analysis, however, shows 
that non-obligatory ECSR investments are very small if they exist and we cannot exclude that 
they occur under opportunistic motives. 
Second, we provide empirical evidence for our contingency model on non-obligatory 
ECSR investments. CPC branches are a clear signal to the CPC that the private firm wants to 
engage with CPC directives. We identify three important factors that contribute or restrain 
ECSR investment in firms that chose to build a CPC branch. One, privately-owned firms 
under the majority or sole ownerships of the entrepreneur are more likely to contribute to 
ECSR. This result adds some clarification to prior research that has found mixed results, but 
has been undertaken in other or with less distinct ownership categories. Our setting reduces 
the extent of goal conflicts within the firm (Cyert and March 1963) in comparison to prior 
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work and shows that while economic reasons are likely to prevalent in most cases, there may 
be firm and individual level considerations that lead to non-obligatory ECSR investments. In 
addition, our starting was that an entrepreneur with the choice to install or not install a CPC 
branch does this to establish clear linkages that should indicate that they are willing to follow 
the CPC’s directives and that they recognize that they follow the leadership of the CPC. We 
find that in some cases, the installation of a CPC branch in itself may be the desired signal 
and we find very restrictive non-obligatory investment patterns. 
Similarly, privately-owned firms invest more in fulfilling CPC directives if they have 
some financial slack to do so. This finding is consistent with the literature on financial slack 
and ECSR. Firms contribute if they can afford to invest in a shared goal. If firms face 
financial constraints, voluntary contributions to a public cause reduce the ability to give. 
Firms operating in areas with higher levels of marketization are relatively bigger 
investors into ECSR. This finding confirms our explanation that expected reciprocity from 
the CPC/government and the competitions among peer firms may drive privately-owned 
firms to work more closely along the lines directed by the CPC by making more ECSR 
investments. 
Third, our study contributes to the social exchange theory by applying it to a unique 
setting. The social exchange theory explains exchanges and how they happen, explicating 
relationships formed on the basis of social exchanges (Cropanzano and Mitchell 2005; 
Emerson 1976). Despite the calls for studies beyond exchanges between two people 
(Cropanzano et al. 2017), most research has discussed individual exchanges rather than 
exchanges between individuals and organizational entities. In this paper, however, we 
approach the exchanges between individuals (i.e., entrepreneurs) and organizational entities 
(i.e., CPC branches in private firms), thus answering the calls from Cropanzano et al. (2017). 
28 
 
Actually, the strength of our study is the focus on entrepreneurs who own (by majority share) 
their firms and thus are able to interact with the CPC branches in their firms. Such a setting 
offers us a great opportunity to approach the social exchange theory in a unique way and 
extend its applications. Moreover, most research using the social exchange theory has 
focused on economic exchanges. In our setting, however, we find that other forms such as 
information, power or philanthropy may also play a role. 
This paper is not without limitations. Most interestingly, while we confirm our 
hypothesis, the absolute and also relative contributions, the investments by privately-owned 
firms are very small. In fact, in most cases, the non-obligatory investments are not substantial 
and at best provide a signalling effect that a contribution was made. However, the size of the 
contributions is so limited that they are unlikely to make a difference in achieving 
environmental goals set by the CPC. Additionally, while we discuss much about ECSR, we 
acknowledge that there may be an ethical dimension concerning such investments. The scope 
and space limitations of this paper made it necessary to reduce this discussion to a minimum.  
Managerial Implications 
This paper has interesting managerial implications. First, entrepreneurs in Chinese 
privately-owned firms need to know that in addition to their personal ties to government 
officials, installation of a CPC branch could also serve the role of political connections. 
Similar to the former, the latter could also benefit entrepreneurs’ firms in multiple ways such 
as gaining crucial information and opportunities from the government and securing resources 
that are not available in the market. More importantly, the CPC branches strive to contribute 
to the development of privately-owned firms in a proactive way by offering advice as well as 
by assisting in human resources management. As a result, the CPC branches in privately-
owned firms become a personalized entity that interacts with the entrepreneurs, which could 
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not be realized by simply establishing personal ties with the government officials. 
Entrepreneurs really need to gain a better understanding of this unique type of political 
connection in the Chinese setting.  
Second, entrepreneurs may understand their voluntary ECSR engagement more fully by 
comprehending the social exchange logic that this paper is built on. As we have mentioned, 
the CPC branches act as a personalized entity that tries all out to help entrepreneurs and their 
firms. Although their primary goal is to gain a foothold in the privately-owned firms so as to 
fulfill their roles as grass-root organizations of the CPC, their existence is actually conducive 
to the development of privately-owned firms. To reciprocate, and also to gain future rewards, 
entrepreneurs echo the call from the CPC and contribute to the ECSR investment 
(Cropanzano and Mitchell 2005; Emerson 1976).  
Third, based on the findings of this paper, entrepreneurs may also gain a deeper 
understanding of how their willingness to do good to the environment may be suppressed by 
the corporate governance, financial conditions and the task environment in which they 
embedded. Although the regional environment is beyond the control of entrepreneurs, they 
may strive to alter the intra-firm environment so as to interact with the CPC branch and the 
CPC in a more intimate way. 
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Fig. 1. The theoretical model 
 



























































   
Fig. 2. The interaction plots 
As the MarOrient is a continuous variable, following Aiken and West (1991), we chose two point 0.132 (one 
standard deviation below the mean) and 0.324 (one standard deviation above the mean) when drawing 
the interaction plots. The X axis is the independent variable PB. The Y axis is the predictor of the dependent 





Table 1 Sample distribution 




Province Sample Percent Province Sample Percent 
Anhui 485 3% Hubei 875 5% Shaanxi 363 2% 
Beijing 753 4% Hunan 431 2% Shanghai 1,208 7% 
Fujian 338 2% Jilin 474 3% Sicuan 602 3% 
Gansu 304 2% Jiangsu 1,925 11% Tianjin 392 2% 
Guangdong 1,303 7% Jiangxi 386 2% Tibet 40 0% 
Guangxi 316 2% Liaoning 775 4% Xinjiang 188 1% 
Guizhou 340 2% Inner Mongolia 290 2% Yunnan 258 1% 
Hainan 245 1% Ningxia 203 1% Zhejiang 1,352 8% 
Hebei 586 3% Qinghai 154 1% Chongqing 625 4% 
Henan 503 3% Shandong 1,133 6%    
Heilongjiang 505 3% Shanxi 338 2%    
Panel B: by industries 
Industry 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 Total 
Agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry and fishing 149 188 281 268 373 1,259 
Mining 42 55 100 74 70 341 
Manufacturing 1,108 1,218 1,355 1,508 1,599 6,788 
Electric power, heat, gas and water production 30 28 38 34 52 182 
Construction 122 143 226 273 288 1,052 
Transportation and storage 63 61 109 122 107 462 
Information technology 88 144 174 151 157 714 
Wholesale and retail 483 498 606 676 754 3,017 
Hotels and catering services 105 112 142 157 185 701 
Real estate 54 65 89 97 132 437 
Rental and commercial service 19 25 35 117 182 378 
Personal care & services 50 59 76 38 147 370 
Science, education, culture and public health 73 75 98 91 187 524 
Others 193 432 107 321 412 1,465 







Table 2 Summary statistics 
variable Mean SD Min P5 P25 P50 P75 P95 
EnInvest 0.345 0.475 0 0 0 0 1 1 
LnEnInvest 3.768 5.405 0 0 0 0 9.904 13.430 
PB 0.331 0.470 0 0 0 0 1 1 
CenGovern 0.750 0.433 0 0 1 1 1 1 
MarOrient 0.228 0.096 0.034 0.077 0.157 0.219 0.300 0.391 
FC 0.282 0.450 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Party_member 0.358 0.479 0 0 0 0 1 1 
PC 0.241 0.427 0 0 0 0 0 1 
CPPCC 0.304 0.460 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Prior_gov_job 0.166 0.372 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Gender 0.147 0.354 0 0 0 0 0 1 
CEO_age 3.808 0.192 3.219 3.466 3.689 3.829 3.951 4.094 
Edu_dummy 0.570 0.495 0 0 0 1 1 1 
Size_sales 16.008 2.307 9.903 12.051 14.403 16.118 17.707 19.683 
Firm_age 2.087 0.686 0 0.693 1.792 2.197 2.565 2.996 





Table 3 Correlation matrix 
  EnInvest (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
1.LnEnInvest 0.96                 
2.PB 0.27 0.30                
3.CenGovern 0.08 0.09 0.15               
4.MarOrient 0.06 0.08 0.05 -0.02              
5.FC -0.06 -0.07 -0.03 -0.01 -0.03             
6.Party_member 0.12 0.13 0.33 0.07 0.07 -0.01            
7.PC 0.19 0.21 0.30 0.09 0.03 0.04 0.18           
8.CPPCC 0.14 0.15 0.21 0.08 -0.02 0.02 0.03 0.32          
9.Prior_gov_job 0.09 0.10 0.21 0.10 0.01 -0.02 0.25 0.11 0.05         
10.Gender -0.09 -0.09 -0.11 -0.06 -0.02 0.01 -0.11 -0.07 -0.06 -0.09        
11.CEO_age 0.11 0.12 0.19 0.05 0.02 0.00 0.21 0.16 0.11 0.24 -0.10       
12.Edu_dummy 0.03 0.04 0.11 0.04 0.03 -0.02 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.01 -0.07      
13.Size_sales 0.33 0.38 0.48 0.18 0.12 -0.07 0.20 0.32 0.26 0.18 -0.14 0.22 0.15     
14.Firm_age 0.12 0.14 0.19 0.06 0.02 -0.06 0.08 0.14 0.17 0.09 -0.07 0.29 0.04 0.30    
15.ROS 0.00 -0.01 -0.08 -0.04 -0.01 -0.13 -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 -0.05 0.02 -0.06 -0.02 -0.19 -0.03   
16. Union 0.27 0.29 0.57 0.16 0.04 0.00 0.20 0.27 0.23 0.18 -0.09 0.20 0.10 0.48 0.23 -0.10  




Table 4 Comparison table  
Variables 
G1:PB=0   G2:PB=1 
MeanDiff 
N Mean   N Mean 
EnInvest 11843 0.256  5847 0.527 -0.271*** 
LnEnInvest 11843 2.621  5847 6.09 -3.469*** 
Party_member 11843 0.248  5847 0.582 -0.334*** 
PC 11843 0.149  5847 0.425 -0.276*** 
CPPCC 11843 0.237  5847 0.44 -0.203*** 
Prior_gov_job 11843 0.11  5847 0.278 -0.167*** 
Gender 11843 0.173  5847 0.094 0.079*** 
CEO_age 11843 3.781  5847 3.86 -0.079*** 
Edu_dummy 11843 0.531  5847 0.647 -0.116*** 
Size_sales 11843 15.227  5847 17.589 -2.361*** 
Firm_age 11843 1.993  5847 2.276 -0.283*** 
ROS 11843 0.108   5847 0.071 0.036*** 





Table 5 The Party branch and ECSR 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 EnInvest LnEnInvest EnInvest LnEnInvest EnInvest LnEnInvest EnInvest LnEnInvest 
         
PB 0.105*** 1.306*** 0.070*** 0.786*** 0.111*** 1.416*** 0.063* 0.473 
 (11.283) (11.342) (3.663) (3.465) (10.208) (10.880) (2.370) (1.436) 
CenGovern   0.011+ 0.114     
   (1.652) (1.630)     
PB*CenGovern   0.041* 0.619*     
   (2.097) (2.576)     
FC     -0.026* -0.188+   
     (-2.390) (-1.707)   
PB*FC     -0.024+ -0.400*   
     (-1.823) (-2.460)   
MarOrient       0.055 0.281 
       (0.442) (0.209) 
PB*MarOrient       0.186+ 3.640** 
       (1.799) (2.761) 
Party_member 0.000 0.017 0.000 0.018 0.001 0.014 -0.000 0.011 
 (0.002) (0.155) (0.010) (0.167) (0.076) (0.132) (-0.034) (0.102) 
PC 0.055*** 0.708*** 0.055*** 0.698*** 0.055*** 0.707*** 0.055*** 0.697*** 
 (6.158) (7.331) (6.115) (7.276) (6.072) (7.366) (6.141) (7.331) 
CPPCC 0.017+ 0.149 0.017+ 0.149 0.017+ 0.153 0.017+ 0.162 
 (1.683) (1.276) (1.681) (1.280) (1.730) (1.315) (1.758) (1.388) 
Prior_gov_job 0.020+ 0.274* 0.019 0.262* 0.018 0.273* 0.019+ 0.270* 
 (1.733) (2.093) (1.631) (1.978) (1.594) (2.073) (1.710) (2.058) 
Gender -0.023** -0.275** -0.023** -0.271** -0.023** -0.275** -0.023** -0.277** 
 (-2.795) (-3.027) (-2.750) (-2.975) (-2.809) (-3.037) (-2.779) (-3.014) 
CEO_age -0.005 -0.161 -0.005 -0.163 -0.001 -0.150 -0.004 -0.157 
 (-0.205) (-0.677) (-0.214) (-0.682) (-0.045) (-0.623) (-0.194) (-0.657) 
Edu_dummy -0.010 -0.066 -0.011 -0.075 -0.007 -0.059 -0.010 -0.075 
 (-1.156) (-0.744) (-1.238) (-0.841) (-0.799) (-0.676) (-1.222) (-0.858) 
Size_sales 0.043*** 0.594*** 0.042*** 0.589*** 0.042*** 0.589*** 0.043*** 0.593*** 
 (16.594) (16.946) (16.382) (16.937) (16.054) (16.844) (16.564) (16.895) 
Firm_age 0.007 0.009 0.007 0.008 0.006 0.006 0.007 0.010 
 (1.488) (0.133) (1.472) (0.119) (1.343) (0.098) (1.487) (0.143) 
ROS 0.126*** 1.393*** 0.126*** 1.396*** 0.120*** 1.323*** 0.127*** 1.411*** 
 (5.827) (5.503) (5.813) (5.487) (5.903) (5.495) (5.871) (5.582) 
_cons -0.320*** -5.369*** -0.323*** -5.395*** -0.290** -5.026*** -0.326*** -5.345*** 
 (-3.366) (-5.186) (-3.369) (-5.160) (-2.917) (-4.809) (-3.496) (-5.340) 
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Random-effect Parameters       
Var (Level-2) 0.003*** 0.323*** 0.003*** 0.318*** 0.003*** 0.316*** 0.003*** 0.317*** 
 (3.646) (3.922) (3.679) (3.981) (3.624) (3.94) (3.744) (4.234) 
Var (Level-1) 0.178*** 22.006*** 0.178*** 21.982*** 0.178*** 21.967*** 0.178*** 21.977*** 
 (37.617) (30.729) (37.797) (30.911) (37.519) (30.715) (37.358) (30.434) 
Var(MarOrient)       0.054*** 0.056*** 
       (21.792) (24.864) 
Sample Size         
Level-1: Firm 17690 17690 17690 17690 17690 17690 17690 17690 
Level-2: 
Province 
31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 
t statistics in parentheses 






Table 6 Treatment effects (PSM) 
Variable Sample Treated Controls Difference T-stat 
 
1.Matching on firm characteristics 
EnInvest Unmatched 0.527  0.255  0.271  37.08*** 
 ATT 0.527  0.344  0.183  20.26*** 
LnEnInvest Unmatched 6.090  2.621  3.469  42.12*** 
 ATT 6.090  3.714  2.376  22.55*** 
 
2.Matching on firm and entrepreneur characteristics 
EnInvest Unmatched 0.524  0.259  0.265  30.71*** 
 ATT 0.524  0.346  0.178  16.87*** 
LnEnInvest Unmatched 6.020  2.641  3.380  34.91*** 
 ATT 6.020  3.684  2.336  19.03*** 
 
3.Matching on firm and entrepreneur characteristics, industry and year dummy 
EnInvest Unmatched 0.524  0.259  0.265  30.71*** 
 ATT 0.524  0.357  0.168  15.79*** 
LnEnInvest Unmatched 6.020  2.641  3.380  34.91*** 
 ATT 6.020  3.782  2.238  18.21*** 






Table 7 Instrument variable  
 (1) (2) (3) 
 PB EnInvest LnEnInvest 
    
PB  0.741*** 2.901*** 
  (11.592) (12.847) 
Union 0.334***   
 (44.898)   
PB_Environ 0.384***   
 (25.927)   
Party_member 0.163*** -0.083** -0.294** 
 (24.668) (-3.115) (-3.116) 
PC 0.083*** 0.080** 0.482*** 
 (10.505) (2.804) (4.346) 
CPPCC 0.019** 0.028 0.044 
 (2.710) (1.103) (0.467) 
Prior_gov_job 0.052*** 0.024 0.153 
 (6.236) (0.791) (1.357) 
Gender -0.009 -0.082* -0.257** 
 (-1.244) (-2.502) (-2.737) 
CEO_age 0.010 -0.003 -0.221 
 (0.655) (-0.040) (-1.115) 
Edu_dummy 0.015** -0.052* -0.108 
 (2.696) (-2.255) (-1.456) 
Size_sales 0.038*** 0.120*** 0.484*** 
 (25.093) (15.781) (19.598) 
Firm_age -0.003 0.032+ -0.014 
 (-0.675) (1.827) (-0.244) 
ROS 0.013 0.534*** 1.377*** 
 (1.071) (8.931) (8.535) 
_cons -0.659*** -2.688*** -3.766*** 
 (-11.075) (-9.829) (-4.527) 
Industry Yes Yes Yes 
Year Yes Yes Yes 
Region Yes Yes Yes 
N 17652 17652 17652 
Wald test   0.233 
Sargan-Hansen test  0.741*** 2.901*** 
t statistics in parentheses 
+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table 8 The Party branch and ECSR (TCZ) 
 TCZ Non-TCZ 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 EnInvest LnEnInvest EnInvest LnEnInvest 
     
PB 0.105*** 1.314*** 0.095*** 1.184*** 
 (8.112) (7.956) (5.714) (5.544) 
Party_member -0.003 -0.022 0.005 0.094 
 (-0.230) (-0.172) (0.348) (0.532) 
PC 0.060*** 0.743*** 0.048* 0.636** 
 (5.770) (6.292) (2.369) (2.996) 
CPPCC 0.023+ 0.231 -0.003 -0.072 
 (1.790) (1.544) (-0.209) (-0.461) 
Prior_gov_job 0.015 0.223+ 0.029+ 0.387+ 
 (1.187) (1.750) (1.812) (1.726) 
Gender -0.020* -0.271* -0.027+ -0.271+ 
 (-1.995) (-2.535) (-1.789) (-1.650) 
CEO_age 0.021 0.159 -0.065+ -0.934* 
 (0.667) (0.474) (-1.708) (-2.505) 
Edu_dummy -0.010 -0.055 -0.009 -0.088 
 (-1.149) (-0.593) (-0.646) (-0.633) 
Size_sales 0.041*** 0.576*** 0.046*** 0.635*** 
 (14.734) (14.942) (10.285) (10.678) 
Firm_age 0.006 0.011 0.011 0.026 
 (1.177) (0.188) (0.919) (0.163) 
ROS 0.155*** 1.635*** 0.055 0.796+ 
 (6.586) (6.306) (1.635) (1.956) 
_cons -0.463*** -6.502*** -0.197 -3.010+ 
 (-3.711) (-4.733) (-1.253) (-1.942) 
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 12473 12473 5217 5217 
t statistics in parentheses 





Appendix Table 1 Variables definition  
Variable Definition 
Dependent variables 
EnInvest A dummy variable, which equals to one if the firm has any environmental 
investment at the time of the survey and equals to zero otherwise. 
lnEnInvest The log transformation of the sum of the environmental investments and one. 
Independent Variable 
PB A dummy variable, it is equal to one if a focal firm has already set up a Party 
branch within the firm in the survey year, and it is equal to zero otherwise. 
Moderating Variables 
CenGovern It is equal to one if the entrepreneur reported himself/herself in the survey that 
he/she was the final decision-maker. 
FC A dummy variable that equals one if the firm does not pay any dividend in the 
survey year, and it equals to zero, otherwise. 
MarOrient The proportion of total fixed investment in a province that comes from private 




Party member A dummy variable that equals to one if the firm’s owner is a member of the Chinese 
Communist Party at the time of the survey and equals to zero if otherwise. 
Prior_gov_ job A dummy variable that equals to one if the firm’s owner used to work for either the 
government or the Party before founding the firm and equals to zero if otherwise. 
PC A dummy variable that equals to one if the firm’s owner is a member of the 
People’s Congress at the time of the survey and equals to zero if otherwise. 
CPPCC A dummy variable that equals to one if the firm’s owner is a member of the 
People’s Consultative Conference at the time of the survey and equals to zero if 
otherwise. 
Gender A dummy variable that equals to one if the entrepreneur is a female and equals to 
zero if otherwise 
CEO_age Log of the age of the entrepreneur at the time of the survey 
Edu_dummy A dummy variable that equals to one if the entrepreneur has obtained a bachelor’s 
degree at the time of the survey and equals to zero if otherwise  
Firm characteristics 
Size_sales The total sales of the firm in the survey year 
Firm_age The age of the firm at the time of the survey 
ROS The return over sales of the firm 
Instrumental Variables 
Union A dummy variable that equals to one if the firm has a labor union at the time of the 
survey. 
PB-Environ 
The average ratio of private firms that already setup party branches in the survey 




Appendix Table 2 Post-hoc probing test  
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
EnInvest LnEnInvest EnInvest LnEnInvest 
 




0.272*** 1.356*** 0.176*** 0.717*** 
(9.728) (12.404) (3.354) (3.599) 
    




0.243*** 0.964*** 0.267*** 1.367*** 
(5.436) (5.760) (9.207) (12.018) 
 




0.295*** 1.598*** 0.221*** 0.909*** 
(8.793) (11.972) (6.489) (7.062) 
    
17690 17690 17690 17690 
t statistics in parentheses 
+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
